FULL TEXT: Transcript of oral arguments on Philippines vs China arbitration case

The Peace Palace at the Hague, the Netherlands is the seat of the Permanent Court of Arbitration, which has the tribunal hearing the case filed by the Philippines against China's territorial claims.Wikimedia Commons/Yeu Ninje/International Court of Justice

MANILA, Philippines - The Arbitral Tribunal of the Permanent Court of Arbitration at The Hague, Netherlands released the full transcript of the oral hearings on the territorial disputes in the West Philippine Sea as requested by the Philippines.

source:  Philippine Star

Foreign policy challenges under ASEAN integration, Chinese expansionism

De La Salle University professor and security strategist Renato De Castro presented an important foreign policy challenge before the diplomatic and foreign policy community during the last July 29th Albert Del Rosario Institute roundtable discussions in Makati.

Focused on Philippines-Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) relations with China, de Castro set the background for discussing the opportunities and issues that confront the post-Aquino III government.

The context: ASEAN prepares for the 2015 community-building project.

Current chair Malaysian Prime Minister Najib Razak’s statement of the 26th ASEAN Summit in Kuala Lumpur and Langkawi affirmed the progress made by member states in the various sectors of implementing the road map, the Initiative for ASEAN Integration (IAI) and the ASEAN connectivity master plan.

However, current ASEAN integration is taking place against Chinese expansionism in the South China Sea (SCS).

The Diplomat’s associate editor and Asian security expert, Prashanth Parameswaran, probes into the strategic unfolding of China’s “incremental assertiveness” or a “step-by step” process of operationalizing and enforcing its contentious nine dash line policy which began with creeping incursions in the Reed bank in 2009.

Its “reef expansion” activities proceeded with the de facto take over of the Scarborough shoal in 2012; placement of an oil rig in Vietnam’s exclusive economic zone in 2014 and massive land reclamations in 2015.

Centre for Strategic and International Studies senior associate, Bonnie Glaser was more categorical in describing China’s assertiveness in shifting from “rapid island building” in Fiery Cross, Johnson, Subi, Sand cay reefs, etc., to the militarization of reclaimed islands. According to Glaser, islands are now increasingly being equipped with military facilities such as airstrips and materiel for surveillance, monitoring and patrol.

The scale of China’s expansionism is so unprecedented that the transformation of the water features prior and after reclamation is now documented in a dedicated link in the Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative (http://amti.csis.org/island-tracker/).

ASEAN-China relations scholars are in agreement that China’s revisionism of the status quo in the SCS is fast overtaking the ability of ASEAN member states to conclude a Code of Conduct.

Scholars have argued that for the Philippines, the absence of a code may bear negatively on the outcomes of arbitration under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, especially when submerged islands are reclaimed and “generate” maritime entitlements for the littoral state.

Beyond rules formation, the Code of Conduct will be ASEAN’s “unified position” in dealing with China on the SCS matter. Twice did the ASEAN-Philippines attempt at an immediate passage of a Code of Conduct. First in 1999 as a reaction to Chinese military incursions in the Mischief Reef and second, in 2012, in response to the stand off between Philippines-China naval forces at Scarborough shoal.

History tells us that these failed attempts were reflective of the precarious nature of ASEAN centrality in the face of territorial conflicts with China. On the one hand, it also reveals much of the volatility of China’s commitment to proceed normatively on this issue.

Developments since 2012 have not only indicated the slow pace of ASEAN’s negotiations with China on the code of conduct but they have also ascertained China’s preference for “ambiguity” and dichotomy in approaching politico-security and economic issues and in engaging ASEAN in high and low politics.

Statements of the Chinese Foreign Ministry tell us that China does not see the need to expedite negotiations on the code.

It denies the existence of freedom of navigation issues in the SCS and insists that a regime on dispute settlement will evolve only after many maritime cooperative projects are cultivated between China and ASEAN, as a means of implementing the non binding Declaration on the Code of Conduct (2002). This includes projects on the low politics kind such as seminars/workshops on search and rescue, hotline communication, etc.

Yet, how does one build trust when mistrust has penetrated the high politics side of maritime affairs in the SCS?

A more perplexing question is found in China’s “dual track” approach to the SCS disputes.

China insists that ASEAN cannot assert a regional identity when bilateral conflicts are at stake.

Many ASEAN-China scholars have looked at this as a clearly Machiavellian strategy of divide and conquer. It mirrors a bigger actor’s condescending view of a smaller (regional) actor. In practice, the force behind any regional grouping is a united front. Not to recognize this for ASEAN undermines its role in the construction of a southeast Asian regional infrastructure.

Against what appears as tumultuous relations with China, are foreign policy opportunities in working with ASEAN’s non-claimant yet “interested” states of Singapore and Indonesia. Both have supported an expeditious and early conclusion of the code of conduct.

In addition, they have also argued that the SCS security extends beyond the realm of territorial and maritime disputes and towards non traditional piracy and terrorism that pose a real threat to regional stability.

Managing the outcomes of arbitration, possible joint development of SCS islands, coupled with Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement and the Armed Forces of the Philippines’ modernization as “inter-mestic” responses to an expansionist China will occupy the agenda of the next Philippine president. Indeed,the SCS issue shows that it is high time for the next administration to pay more attention to foreign policy.

Alma Maria O. Salvador, is Assistant Professor of political science at Ateneo de Manila University (ADMU).

Daisy See is assistant professor of Chinese Studies at ADMU.

source:  Businessworld

Legislator to govt: Protect Recto Bank from China

OWING to the territorial dispute in the West Philippine Sea, a lawmaker on Sunday urged the government to protect the oil- and gas-rich Recto Bank, which holds the key to the country’s energy independence.

“We must secure and defend Recto Bank at all costs. We should assume jurisdiction over the conservation, exploration and exploitation of the seamount’s vast hydrocarbon deposits for the benefit of future Filipino generations,” House Deputy Minority Leader Arnel Ty said.

“We should not allow China’s protests and pestering to disrupt our efforts to harness Recto Bank’s oil and gas assets,” Ty, who speaks for the minority in the House energy committee, added.

Also called Reed Bank, Recto is a large underwater mount that rises just 9 to 45 meters short of the sea level. While the bank is well within the Philippines’s 200-mile Exclusive Economic Zone, it is the subject of a territorial row with China.

Ty, citing former National Security Adviser Roilo S. Golez, said China has been raring to seize and occupy Recto Bank.

Earlier, the US Energy Information Administration, citing geological surveys, estimated that the West Philippine Sea may contain up to 5.4 billion barrels of oil and 55.1 trillion cubic feet of natural gas, “with the bulk of the resources likely in the contested Reed Bank at the northeast end of the Spratlys.”

“Actually, studies of extensive seismic data indicate that Recto Bank’s Sampaguita gas field alone has up to 4.6 trillion cubic feet of natural gas and 115 million barrels of oil,” Ty said.

“To put this in perspective, the fully operational Malampaya gas field contains only up to 2.7 trillion cubic feet of natural gas and 85 million barrels of condensate,” he added.

The largest hydrocarbon deposit ever discovered in the Philippines, Malampaya now produces 146 billion cubic feet of gas every year, and the fuel drives three of Luzon’s largest power plants that are based in Batangas.

Meanwhile, the lawmaker also called on the government, particularly the Department of Energy (DOE), to lift the order that has shut down oil and gas drilling activities in Recto Bank, which lies just 80 nautical miles northwest off the Palawan coast.

In addition, Ty said that the consortium that runs the Recto Bank petroleum service contract (SC) should be permitted to resume its search for oil and gas supplies.

Forum Energy Plc., the private operator of SC 72, was originally set to drill two exploratory wells in Recto Bank this month.

However, in March, the DOE granted a force majeure order on SC 72, citing the territorial dispute with China and the ongoing United Nations arbitration proceedings.

Owing to the force majeure, Forum had to abandon all exploration work “until further notice from the DOE.”

Forum has a 70-percent interest in SC 72, with the remaining 30 percent held by Monte Oro Resources and Energy Inc.

Forum is majority owned by Philex Petroleum Corp., a Philippine Stock Exchange-listed entity run by businessman Manuel V. Pangilinan.

Tidemark Holdings Ltd., controlled by former Trade Minister Roberto V. Ongpin, also has a minority stake in Forum.

Meanwhile, an Australian-Filipino consortium over the weekend began drilling a deepwater exploratory well in the West Philippine Sea, hoping for an oil strike.

The group, led by Otto Energy Investments Ltd., intends to drill 1,000 meters below the sea bed and hopes to hit the top of a promising hydrocarbon reservoir in SC 55, a deepwater block in the southwest Palawan Basin that is not in disputed territory.

Using the 60,000-ton ultra-deepwater drillship Maersk Venturer, Otto expects to complete the spudding of the Hawkeye-1 well in 23 days at a cost of $24.5 million (P1.1 billion).

source:  Business Mirror

Not only China, even allies are grabbing Philippine-claimed islands in Spratlys

THE Philippines lost four of the 11 islands it is claiming in the Spratlys to its allies Vietnam and Taiwan, in addition to the four reefs that China is now converting into military facilities.

During the forum on the West Philippine Sea held late last week, Defense Undersecretary for Strategic Assessment Raymund Quilop said that out of the 11 islands claimed or owned by the Philippines, three have been occupied and claimed by Vietnam, while the biggest island, Itu Aba or Taiping Island has been occupied by Taiwan.

Unlike China, Vietnam and Taiwan have not militarily fortified the islands that they have occupied during the past years, but instead developed them for commercial purposes or even resorts, escaping the attention of the Philippines and the international community.

One of the islands occupied by Vietnam, the Southwest Cay, is just more than a kilometer away from the Northeast Cay, which is occupied by Philippine troops. When Vice Adm. Alexander Pama was still the Navy flag officer in command, the Philippines and Vietnam agreed to jointly patrol the two islands and their surroundings against China.

Quilop said that the Philippine-claimed Kalayaan Islands Group (KIG) is composed of 11 islands and 86 features, that are also being claimed by China and Brunei Darussalam, in addition to Vietnam and Taiwan.

Of KIG’s reefs, two are occupied by the Philippines, 17 by Vietnam, three by Malaysia and seven by China.

China’s ongoing reclamation or development of the seven reefs that it occupies by turning them into military bases with ports that can accommodate its largest vessels and runways for its aircraft is making the international community and the country nervous because the activity was being undertaken to support its plan of dominating the South China Sea.

These reefs that are being made into artificial islands are Kagitingan Reef (Fiery Cross Reef), Calderon Reef (Cuarteron Reef), Burgos Reef (Gaven Reef), Mabini Reef (Johnson South Reef), McKeenan Reef (Hughes Reef), Panganiban Reef (Mischief Reef) and Zamora Reef (Subi Reef).

The Navy spokesman, Marine Col. Edgard Arevalo, said Subi Reef, where a runway is also being built by China, was the source of at least six challenges or harassments of Philippine patrols over the past weeks.

In those instances, China told the Filipino pilots to turn away because they are in Chinese territory. China also challenged on two occasions US patrols, but its warnings were laughed off by US pilots.

Supreme Court Associate Justice Antonio Carpio said the reclamation on Mischief Reef has reached about 500 hectares while that in Kagitingan Reef, already covers about 200 hectares.

Additional structures and fortifications are being built in the reclaimed areas.

Carpio said that at Burgos Reef, a four to five storey building has also been constructed.

source:  Business Mirror