Aquino and the West Philippine Sea: Realpolitk vs. Moralpolitk?

'The Aquino administration’s injection of morality into foreign-policy discourse has managed to mobilize the Southeast Asian country against a tough neighbor'

A version of this article was originally published by The National Interest in Washington, D.C.

In recent days, anti-China hysteria has reached a new level, with some media outlets alleging that China may have had issued a hidden threat to the Philippines in a recent newspaper publication. A more careful understanding of China’s statements in recent years may actually point at a very different interpretation: China could be actually warning about the supposed possibility of the United States or Japan – as the oriole/sparrow – taking advantage of disputes between the Philippines and China (the mantis and the cicada) to push for their own interests, or that the two neighbors are forgetting the bigger context of their bilateral relations by focusing too much on the maritime disputes.

In fact, for those who study China’s domestic media, it is clear that there is no single voice expressing the authentic/final position of the top leadership (See Evan Osnos’ excellent new book, Age of Ambition). In fact, recent years have also seen the growing irrelevance of the Chinese Foreign Ministry in shaping the country’s foreign policy, as other powerful interest groups pitched in. So even the foreign policy of China is a negotiated outcome of inter-agency jostling. In short, you can’t decipher China’s foreign policy by looking at newspaper clippings or simply the statements of a single agency. Yet, one can’t deny the dangerous uptick in China’s territorial assertiveness at the expense of its neighbors, especially the Philippines.

For years, the Philippines has been hailed as the courageous David that took the Chinese Goliath to the court. As the weaker country, the Philippines has sought to leverage prevailing international law, specifically the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), to challenge China’s dubitable doctrine of “historical rights” and notorious Nine-Dashed-Line claims in adjacent waters. As far as the West Philippine Sea is concerned, the Philippines’ trademark approach is “lawfare” (legal warfare).

None of the other claimant states, from Vietnam to Malaysia and Brunei, have dared to adopt a similar measure against mighty China, though Vietnam has been quietly making some preparations, currently assessing whether the Philippines can overcome the jurisdictional and admissibility hurdle at The Hague.

SUBJECT OF PROTESTS. A photo obtained by Rappler shows the status of reclamation activities in Keenan (Chigua) Reef in the West Philippine Sea (South China Sea) as of December 12, 2014.

Lacking full-fledged sovereignty, Taiwan – considered as a renegade province by Beijing – is no position to launch a credible lawfare, even though it occupies the most coveted naturally-formed feature in the area, the Itu Aba (Taiping to locals), and controls the Pratas chain of islets close to the Northeast Asian theatre. No wonder then, Taipei is more interested, and feverishly advocating for, joint-development and exploitation of resources in the contested areas. (But things could change if the pro-independence opposition Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) wins in the upcoming elections, especially in an era of growing anti-Mainland sentiment in the country.)

The Philippines’ lawfare strategy falls under the rubric of what I call the “Moralpolitik” of the Aquino administration, which came into power in 2010 on the heels of a moral crusade against a rotten state apparatus. Over the years, not only did President Benigno Aquino III seek to hold his predecessor (Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo) to account, but he gradually also recalibrated years of increasingly cordial and quasi-subservient relations with Beijing that reached its zenith in mid-2000s.

For much of the world, it is clear that China, as the bigger power, is flexing its muscle in contravention of international law, regional norms such as the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DoC), and the welfare of weaker neighbors like the Philippines. Seen against this backdrop, without a question, the Philippines’ legal-moralistic approach deserves global applause.

Intent on preserving “moral high ground” amid a protracted legal dispute with China, the Philippines, however, has shunned any significant refurbishment of its dilapidated facilities in the Spratly chain of islands, just when all other claimant countries have been fortifying their position amid China’s massive reclamation activities, which are giving birth to the skeleton of an Air Defense Identification Zone in the South China Sea.

There is even growing worry that China maybe intent on building facilities on the Scarborough Shoal, which falls well within the Philippines’ 200-nautical-miles Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). And unlike other claimant states, China, which has built a 3 kilometers-long airstrip on Fiery Cross – a contested reef that was expanded by 11 times its original size – can now project power from its artificially-created islands in the area (See figure 1). Thus, my worry is that our commitment to moralpolitik – constantly talking about moral high ground, but not preserving strategic high ground – may come at the expense of the urgent necessity to make necessary countermeasures.

Source: Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, CSIS

A principled foreign policy

In The Rise of China vs. the Logic of Strategy, leading strategist Edward Luttwak correctly points out that much of China’s recent maritime assertiveness has to do with Beijing’s pre-mature sense of triumphalism in the aftermath of the 2008 Great Recession, which severely undermined the industrial-financial underpinnings of American power.

Just like many other smaller states, the Philippines, which was at the receiving end of China’s maritime aggression over the Scarborough Shoal in mid-2012, has been only responding to the belligerence of a more powerful and ambitious neighbor. In short, the Aquino administration has been simply reacting to China’s actions, rather than actively shaping the texture of bilateral relations with Beijing.

It is unfair and groundless to blame the Aquino administration as the primary reason for the toxic nature of bilateral relations with China. A basic fact in world politics is that it is the great powers that have the agency to shape the dynamics of international system -- rarely the case with weaker nations like the Philippines. Yet, there is something unique with Aquino’s approach.

With respect to China, there is tremendous reluctance vis-à-vis high-level bilateral dialogue and robust trade and investment relations. The Aquino administration is adamant that bilateral dialogue with China is practically worthless, since Beijing is yet to show good will, while openly expressing doubts vis-à-vis the independence of and motivations behind the establishment of the China-led Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). No wonder then, the Aquino administration has repeatedly turned down offers of negotiations and bilateral dialogue with China, while postponing formal membership in the China-led Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB).

There is also a tremendous (over)emphasis on an inherently risky legal approach and maintaining “moral high ground”. More than two years into our legal complaint against China, we are still waiting for whether the Arbitral Tribunal will exercise jurisdiction on the issue to begin with (see my comprehensive analysis of the Philippines’ arbitration procedures for The National Interest, entitled “The South China Sea Showdown Heads to Court”). From the point of view of the Aquino administration, it is waging a brave, moral crusade against a mighty hegemonic power.

In a recent exchange with Philippine Foreign Secretary Albert Del Rosario, he emphasized the nature of the country’s principled, independent foreign policy. When I asked him aboutreclamation activities of other claimant countries, particularly China and in recent months, he told me that it’s very important for the Philippines “to go to the court with clean hands.”

I raised the point on reclamation activities in light of the Aquino administration’s decision to once-again postpone the refurbishment of its creaking facilities and airstrip on Thitu Island (Pag-Asa), just when other claimant states, including Taiwan, have been upgrading their facilities in the Spratly chain of islands (See figure 2). Vietnam is being accused of undertaking mini-reclamation activities on some of the features it controls in the area.

The other fight

In the meantime, China has reclaimed 810 hectares across disputed waters in less than two years, while Taiwan hasallocated at least $100 million to upgrading its facilities on Itu Aba, Vietnam has allegedly made reclamations on some of the features under its control, while Malaysia is still relishing its sophisticated facilities and airstrip on Swallow Reef, which it upgraded back in 2003. With the exception of the Philippines, other active ASEAN claimant countries have been engaged in upgrading their facilities even after signing the 2002 DoC

Source: Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, CSIS

Ironically, Manila, during the Cold War, was actually among the first countries that built a modern airstrip in the area, acknowledging the necessity of maintaining strong presence on the ground. But now the Philippines has among the least-developed and most under-maintained facilities in the area. Just look at our ragtag outpost (Sierra Madre vessel) on the Second Thomas Shoal, which has been at the receiving end of Chinese Coast Guard forces’ intimidation and siege tacticssince 2013; it is a poignant reminder of the Philippines’ decades-long strategic complacency, which is costing it dearly. For the past 16 years, the country has precariously hosted – on a rotational basis – few, marooned Filipino troops on a rusty, grounded vessel in order to guard its claim over the contested shoal.

The Philippines had no outposts close to the Scarborough Shoal, which it lost to China in 2012. Same can be said about the Mischief Reef, which it lost in 1994. If there were Filipino outposts and troops stationed in Scarborough Shoal and Mischief Reef, they would have been, at least theoretically, covered by the Philippine-US Mutual Defense Treaty, especially if they came under direct assault by other claimant states. So outposts have a deterrence value, no matter how tenuous. Only recently did the Philippines decide to undertake desperately-needed maintenance operations to reinforce the hull and deck of the dilapidated World War II relic in Second Thomas Shoal.

Overall, the Aquino administration’s “Moralpolitk” – injection of morality into foreign-policy discourse -–has managed to mobilize the Southeast Asian country against a tough neighbor. I have my utmost respect for the Aquino administration and the Department of Foreign Affairs, who have shown their sincere commitment to protecting our national interest, abiding by international law, and not succumbing to carrots and pressure. But we have to also make sure that the moralistic approach will not come at expense of more tangible means of defending the Philippines’ claims and national interest. - Rappler.com

Richard Javad Heydarian teaches political science at De La Salle University, and is the author of "Asia's New Battlefield: US, China, and the Struggle for Western Pacific" (Zed, London). He is a regular contributor to Asia Maritime Transparency Initiativeof Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington D.C.

China’s Political Warfare Against The Us And Asian Allies

By NESTOR MATA

October 27, 2015

WHOEVER wins the Philippine presidency next year should have enough knowledge and wisdom in navigating the country’s foreign relations in the Asian troubled region.

We won’t know yet who of the aspirants for the presidency will be in the final list of the Commission on Elections in December. Still, this early we can say that only four of them will be the contenders, namely, Vice President Jejomar Binay, opposition leader; Mar Roxas, anointed by soon-to-be ex-President Noynoy Aquino as his administration’s bet; Senator Grace Poe aka “Mary Grace Poe Sonora Llamanzares”, an independent candidate; and Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago.

So far, Binay has vowed he will lead a better government if elected next year, while Roxas is expected to continue Aquino’s vaunted “Tuwid na Daan” programs. Poe, a political neophyte, promised to champion good governance and transparency. And Santiago will bring to the presidency her long experience as a lawmaker, a government administrator, and an expert in fiery political rhetoric.

Aside from the task of cleaning up the mess outgoing President Noynoy Aquino’s messy administration in 2016, whoever may be the next president, there is the problem of navigating the nation’s foreign relations in the troubled Asian region. Does he or she have enough knowledge, strength, and wisdom to handle foreign-policy matters, or even just a minimal foreign-policy credibility? 

One or two have talked about the maritime and territorial dispute in the South China Sea, particularly the West Philippine Sea, with China, but is he or she fully aware that Beijing has very recently expanded its aggressive activities in the Asian and Pacific regions? It’s called China’s “political warfare” against the United States and its allies in Asia.

A group of experts recently surveyed China’s efforts against Washington and its allies, according to Prahanth Parameswaran of The Diplomat magazine on current Asian and Pacific affairs. They said these Chinese actions should be examined as part of the broader effort to influence the thoughts and actions of foreign governments, groups and individuals in a manner favorable to Beijing’s own objectives --- activities known as political warfare or influence operations. Here are excerpts from an insightful article on the views of those experts:

Chinese political warfare is deeply rooted in Chinese history, according to Mark Stokes, executive director of the Project 2049 Institute. Stokes pointed out that Beijing has been distorting objective reality and the lengths to which it has been willing to go to do so has been practically striking. 

The practice also enjoys high-level bureaucratic support within the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). Political warfare --- known euphemistically in China as “PLA military liaison work” --- is supported by an elaborate organizational structure that includes elements of the PLA’s General Political Department as well as the CCP’s Central Propaganda Department. 

Aaron Friedberg, a professor at Princeton University, noted that Beijing has been using political warfare as an important part of its ongoing strategic competition with Washington. He said the goal is to persuade the United States to accept China as an equal, and eventually dominant, global power.

Chinese political warfare in the United States, Friedberg said, has become broader and more complex such that it now seeks to influence three particular groups --- “old friends” of China, who were rewarded with dialogues and business ventures; influential elites in business, diplomats and the military who were courted through visits, exchanges and joint research projects; “mass perceptions” swayed through mass media. 

On Taiwan, according to Stokes, the Chinese objective was to ensure that all countries of the world would recognize the People’s Republic of China as the legitimate representative of all of China, including Taiwan by working to implement the “one country, two systems” formula.

With respect to Japan, Randy Schriver, the president and CEO of the Project 2049 Institute, said that China is using history as a major part of its political warfare in order to create a distorted narrative of Japanese “militarization” and to sow divisions within the US-Japan alliance. 

Beijing’s selective reading of history, in the view of Shriver, former Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, not only largely leave out the last 70 years during which the US-Japan alliance has been one of the foundations of Asian prosperity, including China’s, but hides China’s own abuse of history in its museums and textbooks. 

Incidentally, the conference participants didn’t include in their discussion other US allies in Asia, such as the Philippines and Vietnam, among the priority countries for Chinese political warfare. But they did acknowledge that Chinese political warfare activities face some serious limitations, including the growing tension between words and deeds as well as the broadening of the conversation on China in Washington which makes it more difficult to control narratives.

For the United States, concluded one of the experts, the focus should be on hardening the country against Chinese political warfare activities, and efforts could range from increasing transparency to constructing “counter-narratives” to undermine Chinese messages and expose either weaknesses in capabilities or transgressions of various kinds, including the maritime realm.

Otherwise, the US-China relationship would take past a point of no return! 

source:  Malaya

Angry China says shadowed U.S. warship near man-made islands in disputed sea

The US Navy guided-missile destroyer USS Lassen sails in the Pacific Ocean in a November 2009 photo provided by the U.S. Navy.

A U.S. Navy guided-missile destroyer sailed close to China's man-made islands in the disputed South China Sea on Tuesday, drawing an angry rebuke from Beijing, which said it warned and followed the American vessel.

The patrol by the USS Lassen was the most significant U.S. challenge yet to the 12-nautical-mile territorial limits China asserts around the islands in the Spratly archipelago and could ratchet up tension in one of the world's busiest shipping lanes.

One U.S. defense official said the USS Lassen sailed within 12 nautical miles of Subi Reef. A second defense official said the mission, which lasted a few hours, included Mischief Reef and would be the first in a series of freedom-of-navigation exercises aimed at testing China's territorial claims.

China's Foreign Ministry said the "relevant authorities" monitored, followed and warned the USS Lassen as it "illegally" entered waters near islands and reefs in the Spratlys without the Chinese government's permission.

"China will resolutely respond to any country's deliberate provocations," the ministry said in a statement that gave no details on precisely where the U.S. ship sailed.

Foreign Ministry spokesman Lu Kang later told a daily briefing that if the United States continued to "create tensions in the region," China might conclude it had to "increase and strengthen the building up of our relevant abilities".

Lu did not elaborate, except to say he hoped it did not come to that, but his comments suggested China could further boost its military presence in the South China Sea.

"China hopes to use peaceful means to resolve all the disputes, but if China has to make a response then the timing, method and tempo of the response will be made in accordance with China's wishes and needs."

The second U.S. defense official said additional patrols would follow in coming weeks and could be conducted around features that Vietnam and the Philippines have built up in the Spratlys.

"This is something that will be a regular occurrence, not a one-off event," said the official. "It's not something that's unique to China."

White House spokesman Josh Earnest referred questions on any specific operations to the Pentagon but said the United States had made clear to China the importance of free flow of commerce in the South China Sea.

The U.S. Navy last went within 12 miles of Chinese-claimed territory in the Spratlys in 2012.

China claims most of the South China Sea, through which more than $5 trillion of world trade passes every year. Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei, the Philippines and Taiwan have rival claims.

The Philippines, a vocal critic of China's activities in the South China Sea, welcomed the U.S. action.

"The American passage through these contentious waters is meant precisely to say that there are norms as to what freedom-of-navigation entails and they intend to exercise so there is no de facto changing of the reality on the ground," President Benigno Aquino told reporters.

RISK OF ESCALATION

The decision to go ahead with the patrol follows months of deliberation and it risk upsetting already strained ties with China.

"By using a guided-missile destroyer, rather than smaller vessels ... they are sending a strong message," said Ian Storey, a South China Sea expert at Singapore's Institute of South East Asian Studies.

"They have also said, significantly, that there will be more patrols – so it really now is up to China how it will respond."

Some experts have said China would likely resist attempts to make such U.S. actions routine. China's navy could for example try to block or attempt to surround U.S. vessels, they said, risking an escalation.

Zhu Feng, executive director of the China Centre for Collaborative Studies of the South China Sea at Nanjing University, said he expected Beijing to limit its response as it ultimately did not want confrontation.

"Both sides will be quite verbal but real actions, I hope, will show signs of exercising restraint," Zhu said.

COMPETING CLAIMS

Both Subi and Mischief Reefs were submerged at high tide before China began a dredging project to turn them into islands in 2014.

Under the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, 12-nautical mile limits cannot be set around man-made islands built on previously submerged reefs.

Washington worries that China has built up its outposts with the aim of extending its military reach in the South China Sea. China says they will have mainly civilian uses as well as undefined defense purposes.

The patrol comes just weeks ahead of a series of Asia-Pacific summits President Barack Obama and Chinese President Xi Jinping are expected to attend in the second half of November.

Xi surprised U.S. officials after a meeting with Obama in Washington last month by saying that China had "no intention to militarize" the islands.

Even before that, however, satellite photographs had shown the construction of three military-length airstrips by China in the Spratlys, including one each on Subi and Mischief reefs.

Some U.S. officials have said that the plan for patrols was aimed in part at testing Xi's statement on militarization.

Pentagon officials say the United States regularly conducts freedom-of-navigation operations around the world to challenge excessive maritime claims.

In early September, China sent naval vessels within 12 miles of the Aleutian Islands off Alaska. China said they were there as part of a routine drill following exercises with Russia.

(Reporting by Andrea Shalal, Yeganeh Torbati and David Brunnstrom in Washington and Ben Blanchard in Beijing; Additional reporting by Tim Kelly in Tokyo, Grego Torode in Hong Kong and Lincoln Feast in Sydney; Writing by Dean Yates and Alex Richardson; Editing by Robert Birsel)

source:  Reuters

FULL TEXT: Transcript of oral arguments on Philippines vs China arbitration case

The Peace Palace at the Hague, the Netherlands is the seat of the Permanent Court of Arbitration, which has the tribunal hearing the case filed by the Philippines against China's territorial claims.Wikimedia Commons/Yeu Ninje/International Court of Justice

MANILA, Philippines - The Arbitral Tribunal of the Permanent Court of Arbitration at The Hague, Netherlands released the full transcript of the oral hearings on the territorial disputes in the West Philippine Sea as requested by the Philippines.

source:  Philippine Star

Foreign policy challenges under ASEAN integration, Chinese expansionism

De La Salle University professor and security strategist Renato De Castro presented an important foreign policy challenge before the diplomatic and foreign policy community during the last July 29th Albert Del Rosario Institute roundtable discussions in Makati.

Focused on Philippines-Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) relations with China, de Castro set the background for discussing the opportunities and issues that confront the post-Aquino III government.

The context: ASEAN prepares for the 2015 community-building project.

Current chair Malaysian Prime Minister Najib Razak’s statement of the 26th ASEAN Summit in Kuala Lumpur and Langkawi affirmed the progress made by member states in the various sectors of implementing the road map, the Initiative for ASEAN Integration (IAI) and the ASEAN connectivity master plan.

However, current ASEAN integration is taking place against Chinese expansionism in the South China Sea (SCS).

The Diplomat’s associate editor and Asian security expert, Prashanth Parameswaran, probes into the strategic unfolding of China’s “incremental assertiveness” or a “step-by step” process of operationalizing and enforcing its contentious nine dash line policy which began with creeping incursions in the Reed bank in 2009.

Its “reef expansion” activities proceeded with the de facto take over of the Scarborough shoal in 2012; placement of an oil rig in Vietnam’s exclusive economic zone in 2014 and massive land reclamations in 2015.

Centre for Strategic and International Studies senior associate, Bonnie Glaser was more categorical in describing China’s assertiveness in shifting from “rapid island building” in Fiery Cross, Johnson, Subi, Sand cay reefs, etc., to the militarization of reclaimed islands. According to Glaser, islands are now increasingly being equipped with military facilities such as airstrips and materiel for surveillance, monitoring and patrol.

The scale of China’s expansionism is so unprecedented that the transformation of the water features prior and after reclamation is now documented in a dedicated link in the Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative (http://amti.csis.org/island-tracker/).

ASEAN-China relations scholars are in agreement that China’s revisionism of the status quo in the SCS is fast overtaking the ability of ASEAN member states to conclude a Code of Conduct.

Scholars have argued that for the Philippines, the absence of a code may bear negatively on the outcomes of arbitration under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, especially when submerged islands are reclaimed and “generate” maritime entitlements for the littoral state.

Beyond rules formation, the Code of Conduct will be ASEAN’s “unified position” in dealing with China on the SCS matter. Twice did the ASEAN-Philippines attempt at an immediate passage of a Code of Conduct. First in 1999 as a reaction to Chinese military incursions in the Mischief Reef and second, in 2012, in response to the stand off between Philippines-China naval forces at Scarborough shoal.

History tells us that these failed attempts were reflective of the precarious nature of ASEAN centrality in the face of territorial conflicts with China. On the one hand, it also reveals much of the volatility of China’s commitment to proceed normatively on this issue.

Developments since 2012 have not only indicated the slow pace of ASEAN’s negotiations with China on the code of conduct but they have also ascertained China’s preference for “ambiguity” and dichotomy in approaching politico-security and economic issues and in engaging ASEAN in high and low politics.

Statements of the Chinese Foreign Ministry tell us that China does not see the need to expedite negotiations on the code.

It denies the existence of freedom of navigation issues in the SCS and insists that a regime on dispute settlement will evolve only after many maritime cooperative projects are cultivated between China and ASEAN, as a means of implementing the non binding Declaration on the Code of Conduct (2002). This includes projects on the low politics kind such as seminars/workshops on search and rescue, hotline communication, etc.

Yet, how does one build trust when mistrust has penetrated the high politics side of maritime affairs in the SCS?

A more perplexing question is found in China’s “dual track” approach to the SCS disputes.

China insists that ASEAN cannot assert a regional identity when bilateral conflicts are at stake.

Many ASEAN-China scholars have looked at this as a clearly Machiavellian strategy of divide and conquer. It mirrors a bigger actor’s condescending view of a smaller (regional) actor. In practice, the force behind any regional grouping is a united front. Not to recognize this for ASEAN undermines its role in the construction of a southeast Asian regional infrastructure.

Against what appears as tumultuous relations with China, are foreign policy opportunities in working with ASEAN’s non-claimant yet “interested” states of Singapore and Indonesia. Both have supported an expeditious and early conclusion of the code of conduct.

In addition, they have also argued that the SCS security extends beyond the realm of territorial and maritime disputes and towards non traditional piracy and terrorism that pose a real threat to regional stability.

Managing the outcomes of arbitration, possible joint development of SCS islands, coupled with Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement and the Armed Forces of the Philippines’ modernization as “inter-mestic” responses to an expansionist China will occupy the agenda of the next Philippine president. Indeed,the SCS issue shows that it is high time for the next administration to pay more attention to foreign policy.

Alma Maria O. Salvador, is Assistant Professor of political science at Ateneo de Manila University (ADMU).

Daisy See is assistant professor of Chinese Studies at ADMU.

source:  Businessworld

Legislator to govt: Protect Recto Bank from China

OWING to the territorial dispute in the West Philippine Sea, a lawmaker on Sunday urged the government to protect the oil- and gas-rich Recto Bank, which holds the key to the country’s energy independence.

“We must secure and defend Recto Bank at all costs. We should assume jurisdiction over the conservation, exploration and exploitation of the seamount’s vast hydrocarbon deposits for the benefit of future Filipino generations,” House Deputy Minority Leader Arnel Ty said.

“We should not allow China’s protests and pestering to disrupt our efforts to harness Recto Bank’s oil and gas assets,” Ty, who speaks for the minority in the House energy committee, added.

Also called Reed Bank, Recto is a large underwater mount that rises just 9 to 45 meters short of the sea level. While the bank is well within the Philippines’s 200-mile Exclusive Economic Zone, it is the subject of a territorial row with China.

Ty, citing former National Security Adviser Roilo S. Golez, said China has been raring to seize and occupy Recto Bank.

Earlier, the US Energy Information Administration, citing geological surveys, estimated that the West Philippine Sea may contain up to 5.4 billion barrels of oil and 55.1 trillion cubic feet of natural gas, “with the bulk of the resources likely in the contested Reed Bank at the northeast end of the Spratlys.”

“Actually, studies of extensive seismic data indicate that Recto Bank’s Sampaguita gas field alone has up to 4.6 trillion cubic feet of natural gas and 115 million barrels of oil,” Ty said.

“To put this in perspective, the fully operational Malampaya gas field contains only up to 2.7 trillion cubic feet of natural gas and 85 million barrels of condensate,” he added.

The largest hydrocarbon deposit ever discovered in the Philippines, Malampaya now produces 146 billion cubic feet of gas every year, and the fuel drives three of Luzon’s largest power plants that are based in Batangas.

Meanwhile, the lawmaker also called on the government, particularly the Department of Energy (DOE), to lift the order that has shut down oil and gas drilling activities in Recto Bank, which lies just 80 nautical miles northwest off the Palawan coast.

In addition, Ty said that the consortium that runs the Recto Bank petroleum service contract (SC) should be permitted to resume its search for oil and gas supplies.

Forum Energy Plc., the private operator of SC 72, was originally set to drill two exploratory wells in Recto Bank this month.

However, in March, the DOE granted a force majeure order on SC 72, citing the territorial dispute with China and the ongoing United Nations arbitration proceedings.

Owing to the force majeure, Forum had to abandon all exploration work “until further notice from the DOE.”

Forum has a 70-percent interest in SC 72, with the remaining 30 percent held by Monte Oro Resources and Energy Inc.

Forum is majority owned by Philex Petroleum Corp., a Philippine Stock Exchange-listed entity run by businessman Manuel V. Pangilinan.

Tidemark Holdings Ltd., controlled by former Trade Minister Roberto V. Ongpin, also has a minority stake in Forum.

Meanwhile, an Australian-Filipino consortium over the weekend began drilling a deepwater exploratory well in the West Philippine Sea, hoping for an oil strike.

The group, led by Otto Energy Investments Ltd., intends to drill 1,000 meters below the sea bed and hopes to hit the top of a promising hydrocarbon reservoir in SC 55, a deepwater block in the southwest Palawan Basin that is not in disputed territory.

Using the 60,000-ton ultra-deepwater drillship Maersk Venturer, Otto expects to complete the spudding of the Hawkeye-1 well in 23 days at a cost of $24.5 million (P1.1 billion).

source:  Business Mirror

Not only China, even allies are grabbing Philippine-claimed islands in Spratlys

THE Philippines lost four of the 11 islands it is claiming in the Spratlys to its allies Vietnam and Taiwan, in addition to the four reefs that China is now converting into military facilities.

During the forum on the West Philippine Sea held late last week, Defense Undersecretary for Strategic Assessment Raymund Quilop said that out of the 11 islands claimed or owned by the Philippines, three have been occupied and claimed by Vietnam, while the biggest island, Itu Aba or Taiping Island has been occupied by Taiwan.

Unlike China, Vietnam and Taiwan have not militarily fortified the islands that they have occupied during the past years, but instead developed them for commercial purposes or even resorts, escaping the attention of the Philippines and the international community.

One of the islands occupied by Vietnam, the Southwest Cay, is just more than a kilometer away from the Northeast Cay, which is occupied by Philippine troops. When Vice Adm. Alexander Pama was still the Navy flag officer in command, the Philippines and Vietnam agreed to jointly patrol the two islands and their surroundings against China.

Quilop said that the Philippine-claimed Kalayaan Islands Group (KIG) is composed of 11 islands and 86 features, that are also being claimed by China and Brunei Darussalam, in addition to Vietnam and Taiwan.

Of KIG’s reefs, two are occupied by the Philippines, 17 by Vietnam, three by Malaysia and seven by China.

China’s ongoing reclamation or development of the seven reefs that it occupies by turning them into military bases with ports that can accommodate its largest vessels and runways for its aircraft is making the international community and the country nervous because the activity was being undertaken to support its plan of dominating the South China Sea.

These reefs that are being made into artificial islands are Kagitingan Reef (Fiery Cross Reef), Calderon Reef (Cuarteron Reef), Burgos Reef (Gaven Reef), Mabini Reef (Johnson South Reef), McKeenan Reef (Hughes Reef), Panganiban Reef (Mischief Reef) and Zamora Reef (Subi Reef).

The Navy spokesman, Marine Col. Edgard Arevalo, said Subi Reef, where a runway is also being built by China, was the source of at least six challenges or harassments of Philippine patrols over the past weeks.

In those instances, China told the Filipino pilots to turn away because they are in Chinese territory. China also challenged on two occasions US patrols, but its warnings were laughed off by US pilots.

Supreme Court Associate Justice Antonio Carpio said the reclamation on Mischief Reef has reached about 500 hectares while that in Kagitingan Reef, already covers about 200 hectares.

Additional structures and fortifications are being built in the reclaimed areas.

Carpio said that at Burgos Reef, a four to five storey building has also been constructed.

source:  Business Mirror