‘We got what we wanted’

By: Solita Collas-Monsod

Philippine Daily Inquirer

I guess it’s the week of the Carpios. My last column was about the excellent job Conchita Carpio Morales has been doing as Ombudsman. This time it’s going to be all about Supreme Court Associate Justice Antonio Carpio, and the excellent job he has been doing with respect to the Philippine-Chinese dispute over the West Philippine Sea.

As we all know by now (the news came out yesterday), the Philippines won a significant victory in its stand against China’s bullying tactics. Or, as the wire services put it, Beijing/China suffered a setback/defeat in the case. Or, as an expert at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington put it, the decision was “a major blow for China given that the opinion explicitly rejects China’s arguments that … the Philippines has not done enough to negotiate the issues with China.” Truth will out.

To remind the Reader: This is the most important Philippine foreign policy issue.

How sweet is the taste of victory. And a main contributor to that victory was Antonio Carpio, who has spent more than four years helping craft the legal strategy that led to it, and beating the international bushes to make sure that the lies of China to “prove” its claim are shown up for what they are. He has written about it, he has travelled all over the world and given speeches and lectures about it—and still kept his rigorous schedule at the Supreme Court. Truly a labor of love. This column has written about his efforts over the past two and a half years.

The Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) based in The Hague in the Netherlands unanimously (all five members) found that contrary to China’s claims, it did have the authority to hear seven of Manila’s submissions under Unclos (the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea) and China’s decision not to participate did “not deprive the tribunal of jurisdiction.” China had boycotted the proceedings, claiming that the issue was about sovereignty, and therefore outside the court’s authority. But the Philippines was smart to make it, not a sovereignty issue (thanks in part to Carpio), but a dispute between two states concerning the interpretation or application of the Unclos.

Specifically, it asks the arbitral tribunal to rule on whether China’s so-called 9-dash line claim (under which practically all of the South China Sea is considered its inland waters) or its domestic laws can take away the Philippines’ exclusive economic zone, and its extended continental shelf in the West Philippine Sea, which is ours under the rules of Unclos. By the way, the Philippines and China are both signatories to Unclos, and both are also members of the PCA.

The Philippines made 14 or 15 submissions to the PCA, and the PCA decided to hear seven of them (including the one about the 9-dash line). The rest of the submissions will be decided on as the court hearings continue, because supporting evidence is required. The point is that, in Justice Carpio’s own words, THE BOTTOM LINE: WE GOT WHAT WE WANTED. The first hearings on the merits of the case will take place at the end of November in the Netherlands. It will probably take a year to finish. We are on our way.

What is China’s reaction to this? It still insists that we should first have bilateral talks (negotiations). But Justice Carpio’s reaction to that can be seen in YouTube (Bawal ang Pasaway, Justice Antonio Carpio). According to him, we have had bilateral talks with China since 1995, and we have exhausted ourselves. Eighteen years of bilateral talks is enough. We had to go to arbitration. If we now consent to more bilateral talks, we are weakening our case. Or words to that effect.

Not so trivial trivia: The PCA asked the Philippines to clarify 26 points in its submissions, and we submitted a—would you believe—3,000-page document in reply. Also, China’s “boycott” involved releasing a position paper on its claim, with the proviso that this should not be taken as participation—to all and sundry, including the members of the tribunal. Having its cake and eating it too. Garapal!

Anyway, congratulations to Justice Carpio, our Department of Foreign Affairs, and everyone else who had a hand in this victory. Although I hear (I cannot validate) that not everyone is happy about it. (That means those that want us to submit to China’s hegemony.)

Why Aquino Held Back Comments on US Ship's Patrol Off Subi Reef

By Ellen Tordesillas

October 30, 2015

IN President Aquino’s talk with the Foreign Correspondents Association of the Philippines last Tuesday, about a third of the questions were about the challenge of the United States to China’s claim of sovereignty on the surrounding waters of its artificially-created islands in the disputed waters in the Spratlys in the South China Sea, which the Philippines partly claims.

At the time of the FOCAP Forum, the US guided-missile destroyer USS Lassen was sailing within 12 nautical miles from Subi Reef’s man-made shores, according to reports by the US Navy.

The news report said the ship (which was known later after the forum with the President), also sailed near Mischief Reef, occupied by the Chinese in 1994.

It is significant to note that Mischief Reef and Subi Reef were the nearest to Philippine shores of the eight features in the Spratlys occupied by the Chinese. Subi Reef is 26 kilometers of Philippine –occupied island Pag-asa.

Yet, at the FOCAP forum, it was obvious Aquino was holding back in his answers, so uncharacteristic of him who had earlier compared China’s expansion in the South China Sea to Nazi Germany gobbling up Europe.

Aquino told the foreign correspondents: ”We have voiced our concerns about the buildup of islands or the creation of–buildup of features that somehow resemble islands already at this point in time. We have voiced our concern about the issues that confront the South China Sea in the sense that we have about 40 percent of world trade that has to traverse this particular body of water.

“We have expressed publicly on numerous occasions our concern that any movement through this particular body of water should not be hampered by any entity. And I think we have stated and restated this position and we have actually even gone to as far as arbitration to finally try and resolve these longstanding issues. That, I think, is the support in general–not just to the American transiting of this body of water, but to the general principle that freedom of navigation should not be impeded, especially if we are after our people’s betterment.”

He stuck to that tone when the subject was raised again and again in various forms and angles.

There are two reasons why Aquino was the voice of moderation in a topic that he has in the past been passionate about. One, he does not want to antagonize Chinese President Xi Jinping to make sure that the latter will be in Manila on Nov. 18 and 19 for the Leaders Meeting of the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation or APEC.

Aquino mentioned this in the later part of his answers. He said, “You know, I am welcoming their leader and you put me in a position of criticizing some of their previous actions, which might impinge on our own hosting for economic cooperation.”

In the briefing of Chinese Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Lu Kang, also last Tuesday in Beijing, he was asked if Xi is coming to Manila for APEC. His reply: “The Chinese side has received the letter from President Benigno Aquino III inviting President Xi Jinping to attend the 23rd APEC Economic Leaders’ Meeting. APEC is the most influential forum for economic cooperation and trade in the Asia-Pacific region at the highest level. China was the host of the 22nd APEC Economic Leaders’ Meeting which was held successfully in Beijing and achieved a series of historic outcomes, making prominent contributions to APEC cooperation… It is hoped that this year’s APEC would stick to the principle of focusing on economic cooperation and trade and make new contributions to regional economic cooperation. It is believed that President Xi Jinping will give positive thought to President Aquino’s invitation.”

The other reason is, it could complicate or jeopardize the Philippine case before the United Nations Arbitral Tribunal which was carefully designed not as a territorial conflict but questions on maritime entitlements.

That’s why the Department of Foreign Affairs Oct. 13 statement did not even mention the word “support”. It merely said, “If the US decides to send naval vessels within 12 nautical miles of the reclaimed low-tide elevation features in affirmation of this objective, this would be consistent with international law and rules-based order of the region. Failure to challenge false claims of sovereignty would undermine this order and lead China to the false conclusion that its claims are accepted as a fait accompli.”

It was Defense Secretary Voltaire Gazmin’s brief comment yesterday that nailed the issue. He said despite the artificial islands built by China in the disputed area, the USS Lassen’s successful sailing within the 12 nautical mile of Subi Reef “proved there is freedom of navigation there.”

He said, “Well, ang napu-prove lang natin dito, na meron talagang freedom of navigation. Dahil kasi pag ikaw ay nasisita na dati mong nilalayagan, walang freedom of navigation.”

That brings the issue closer to what really matters to the Philippines.

Fishermen in Zambales complain that the presence of Chinese ships in Scarborough shoal also known as Panatag shoal and Bajo de Masinloc has prevented them from doing their livelihood.

A few months back, in his meeting with a group of reporters in Manila, Admiral Scott Harrison Swift, commander of the US Pacific Command, was asked if the Pacific command would act on the problem of Filipino fishermen in Zambales in pursuit of freedom of navigation.

His reply: “So if it’s a fisheries issue, access to fishing grounds, that’s really a State Department and Department of Justice (issue). It’s really for the international courts to determine. It has to do with EEZ (Exclusive Economic Zone) management.”

source:  Malaya

Philippines wins round 1 in historic case vs China

A UN-backed arbitral tribunal rejects China's strongest argument against the Philippines: that the tribunal has no right to hear the Philippines' case over the West Philippine Sea (South China Sea)


SILENT WITNESS. The venue of the arbitration proceedings is the 100-year-old Peace Palace in The Hague, which also houses the International Court of Justice. Photo courtesy of PCA

MANILA, Philippines (3rd UPDATE) – In a round one victory for the Philippines, a United Nations-backed arbitral tribunal at The Hague, in the Netherlands, unanimously decided it has the right to hear Manila’s historic case against Beijing over the West Philippine Sea (South China Sea).

The tribunal effectively rejected China's strongest argumentagainst the Philippines: that the tribunal at the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) in The Hague has no right to hear the Philippines' case. (READ: FULL TEXT: Philippines' round 1 win vs China over West Philippine Sea)

This initial victory means the tribunal can hear the merits of the Philippines' case – and issue a definitive ruling by 2016.

In a news release late Thursday evening, October 29, the PCA said the tribunal “has held that both the Philippines and China are parties” to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, and therefore “bound by its provisions on the settlement of disputes.”

HISTORIC CASE. The arbitral tribunal in The Hague, Netherlands, listens to the first country that brought China to court over the West Philippine Sea (South China Sea). Photo courtesy of PCA

“The tribunal has also held that China’s decision not to participate in these proceedings does not deprive the tribunal of jurisdiction and that the Philippines’ decision to commence arbitration unilaterally was not an abuse of the Convention’s dispute settlement procedures,” it said.

“In light of the foregoing, the tribunal has concluded that it is presently able to decide that it does have jurisdiction with respect to the matters raised in 7 of the Philippines’ Submissions. The tribunal has concluded, however, that its jurisdiction with respect to 7 other Submissions by the Philippines will need to be considered in conjunction with the merits. The tribunal has requested the Philippines to clarify and narrow one of its Submissions,” the PCA added.

While issuing this award, the PCA clarified: "The tribunal’s award of today’s date is unanimous and concerns only whether the Tribunal has jurisdiction to consider the Philippines’ claims and whether such claims are admissible. The award does not decide any aspect of the merits of the parties’ dispute."

Merits of the case

The Philippine Department of Foreign Affairs had previously explained that settling the jurisdiction question would pave the way for an evaluation of the merits of Manila's legal assertions against Beijing. The Philippines wants the tribunal to declare China's 9-dash line illegal. (READ: PH vs China at The Hague: '80% of fish' at stake)

The 9-dash line is China's demarcation to claim virtually the entire South China Sea. China says the 9-dash line has historical basis. (READ: Top Philippine judge uses Chinese maps vs China)

TEAM PHILIPPINES. Representing all 3 branches of Philippine government, the Philippine delegation comes in full force in The Hague. Photo courtesy of PCA

In an earlier interview, too, Senior Associate Justice Carpio of the Philippine Supreme Court explained, "Once the jurisdiction is won by the Philippines, and the tribunal says it has jurisdiction, then we practically know the tribunal will strike down the 9-dash line."

The tribunal will soon convene a hearing on the merits of Manila's case against Beijing.

The Philippines' lead counsel in its case against China is Paul Reichler, an American lawyer who once defeated his country, the United States, in a landmark international case.

Called a "giant slayer," Reichler is known for "representing small countries against big ones." – Rappler.com

Aquino and the West Philippine Sea: Realpolitk vs. Moralpolitk?

'The Aquino administration’s injection of morality into foreign-policy discourse has managed to mobilize the Southeast Asian country against a tough neighbor'

A version of this article was originally published by The National Interest in Washington, D.C.

In recent days, anti-China hysteria has reached a new level, with some media outlets alleging that China may have had issued a hidden threat to the Philippines in a recent newspaper publication. A more careful understanding of China’s statements in recent years may actually point at a very different interpretation: China could be actually warning about the supposed possibility of the United States or Japan – as the oriole/sparrow – taking advantage of disputes between the Philippines and China (the mantis and the cicada) to push for their own interests, or that the two neighbors are forgetting the bigger context of their bilateral relations by focusing too much on the maritime disputes.

In fact, for those who study China’s domestic media, it is clear that there is no single voice expressing the authentic/final position of the top leadership (See Evan Osnos’ excellent new book, Age of Ambition). In fact, recent years have also seen the growing irrelevance of the Chinese Foreign Ministry in shaping the country’s foreign policy, as other powerful interest groups pitched in. So even the foreign policy of China is a negotiated outcome of inter-agency jostling. In short, you can’t decipher China’s foreign policy by looking at newspaper clippings or simply the statements of a single agency. Yet, one can’t deny the dangerous uptick in China’s territorial assertiveness at the expense of its neighbors, especially the Philippines.

For years, the Philippines has been hailed as the courageous David that took the Chinese Goliath to the court. As the weaker country, the Philippines has sought to leverage prevailing international law, specifically the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), to challenge China’s dubitable doctrine of “historical rights” and notorious Nine-Dashed-Line claims in adjacent waters. As far as the West Philippine Sea is concerned, the Philippines’ trademark approach is “lawfare” (legal warfare).

None of the other claimant states, from Vietnam to Malaysia and Brunei, have dared to adopt a similar measure against mighty China, though Vietnam has been quietly making some preparations, currently assessing whether the Philippines can overcome the jurisdictional and admissibility hurdle at The Hague.

SUBJECT OF PROTESTS. A photo obtained by Rappler shows the status of reclamation activities in Keenan (Chigua) Reef in the West Philippine Sea (South China Sea) as of December 12, 2014.

Lacking full-fledged sovereignty, Taiwan – considered as a renegade province by Beijing – is no position to launch a credible lawfare, even though it occupies the most coveted naturally-formed feature in the area, the Itu Aba (Taiping to locals), and controls the Pratas chain of islets close to the Northeast Asian theatre. No wonder then, Taipei is more interested, and feverishly advocating for, joint-development and exploitation of resources in the contested areas. (But things could change if the pro-independence opposition Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) wins in the upcoming elections, especially in an era of growing anti-Mainland sentiment in the country.)

The Philippines’ lawfare strategy falls under the rubric of what I call the “Moralpolitik” of the Aquino administration, which came into power in 2010 on the heels of a moral crusade against a rotten state apparatus. Over the years, not only did President Benigno Aquino III seek to hold his predecessor (Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo) to account, but he gradually also recalibrated years of increasingly cordial and quasi-subservient relations with Beijing that reached its zenith in mid-2000s.

For much of the world, it is clear that China, as the bigger power, is flexing its muscle in contravention of international law, regional norms such as the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DoC), and the welfare of weaker neighbors like the Philippines. Seen against this backdrop, without a question, the Philippines’ legal-moralistic approach deserves global applause.

Intent on preserving “moral high ground” amid a protracted legal dispute with China, the Philippines, however, has shunned any significant refurbishment of its dilapidated facilities in the Spratly chain of islands, just when all other claimant countries have been fortifying their position amid China’s massive reclamation activities, which are giving birth to the skeleton of an Air Defense Identification Zone in the South China Sea.

There is even growing worry that China maybe intent on building facilities on the Scarborough Shoal, which falls well within the Philippines’ 200-nautical-miles Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). And unlike other claimant states, China, which has built a 3 kilometers-long airstrip on Fiery Cross – a contested reef that was expanded by 11 times its original size – can now project power from its artificially-created islands in the area (See figure 1). Thus, my worry is that our commitment to moralpolitik – constantly talking about moral high ground, but not preserving strategic high ground – may come at the expense of the urgent necessity to make necessary countermeasures.

Source: Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, CSIS

A principled foreign policy

In The Rise of China vs. the Logic of Strategy, leading strategist Edward Luttwak correctly points out that much of China’s recent maritime assertiveness has to do with Beijing’s pre-mature sense of triumphalism in the aftermath of the 2008 Great Recession, which severely undermined the industrial-financial underpinnings of American power.

Just like many other smaller states, the Philippines, which was at the receiving end of China’s maritime aggression over the Scarborough Shoal in mid-2012, has been only responding to the belligerence of a more powerful and ambitious neighbor. In short, the Aquino administration has been simply reacting to China’s actions, rather than actively shaping the texture of bilateral relations with Beijing.

It is unfair and groundless to blame the Aquino administration as the primary reason for the toxic nature of bilateral relations with China. A basic fact in world politics is that it is the great powers that have the agency to shape the dynamics of international system -- rarely the case with weaker nations like the Philippines. Yet, there is something unique with Aquino’s approach.

With respect to China, there is tremendous reluctance vis-à-vis high-level bilateral dialogue and robust trade and investment relations. The Aquino administration is adamant that bilateral dialogue with China is practically worthless, since Beijing is yet to show good will, while openly expressing doubts vis-à-vis the independence of and motivations behind the establishment of the China-led Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). No wonder then, the Aquino administration has repeatedly turned down offers of negotiations and bilateral dialogue with China, while postponing formal membership in the China-led Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB).

There is also a tremendous (over)emphasis on an inherently risky legal approach and maintaining “moral high ground”. More than two years into our legal complaint against China, we are still waiting for whether the Arbitral Tribunal will exercise jurisdiction on the issue to begin with (see my comprehensive analysis of the Philippines’ arbitration procedures for The National Interest, entitled “The South China Sea Showdown Heads to Court”). From the point of view of the Aquino administration, it is waging a brave, moral crusade against a mighty hegemonic power.

In a recent exchange with Philippine Foreign Secretary Albert Del Rosario, he emphasized the nature of the country’s principled, independent foreign policy. When I asked him aboutreclamation activities of other claimant countries, particularly China and in recent months, he told me that it’s very important for the Philippines “to go to the court with clean hands.”

I raised the point on reclamation activities in light of the Aquino administration’s decision to once-again postpone the refurbishment of its creaking facilities and airstrip on Thitu Island (Pag-Asa), just when other claimant states, including Taiwan, have been upgrading their facilities in the Spratly chain of islands (See figure 2). Vietnam is being accused of undertaking mini-reclamation activities on some of the features it controls in the area.

The other fight

In the meantime, China has reclaimed 810 hectares across disputed waters in less than two years, while Taiwan hasallocated at least $100 million to upgrading its facilities on Itu Aba, Vietnam has allegedly made reclamations on some of the features under its control, while Malaysia is still relishing its sophisticated facilities and airstrip on Swallow Reef, which it upgraded back in 2003. With the exception of the Philippines, other active ASEAN claimant countries have been engaged in upgrading their facilities even after signing the 2002 DoC

Source: Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, CSIS

Ironically, Manila, during the Cold War, was actually among the first countries that built a modern airstrip in the area, acknowledging the necessity of maintaining strong presence on the ground. But now the Philippines has among the least-developed and most under-maintained facilities in the area. Just look at our ragtag outpost (Sierra Madre vessel) on the Second Thomas Shoal, which has been at the receiving end of Chinese Coast Guard forces’ intimidation and siege tacticssince 2013; it is a poignant reminder of the Philippines’ decades-long strategic complacency, which is costing it dearly. For the past 16 years, the country has precariously hosted – on a rotational basis – few, marooned Filipino troops on a rusty, grounded vessel in order to guard its claim over the contested shoal.

The Philippines had no outposts close to the Scarborough Shoal, which it lost to China in 2012. Same can be said about the Mischief Reef, which it lost in 1994. If there were Filipino outposts and troops stationed in Scarborough Shoal and Mischief Reef, they would have been, at least theoretically, covered by the Philippine-US Mutual Defense Treaty, especially if they came under direct assault by other claimant states. So outposts have a deterrence value, no matter how tenuous. Only recently did the Philippines decide to undertake desperately-needed maintenance operations to reinforce the hull and deck of the dilapidated World War II relic in Second Thomas Shoal.

Overall, the Aquino administration’s “Moralpolitk” – injection of morality into foreign-policy discourse -–has managed to mobilize the Southeast Asian country against a tough neighbor. I have my utmost respect for the Aquino administration and the Department of Foreign Affairs, who have shown their sincere commitment to protecting our national interest, abiding by international law, and not succumbing to carrots and pressure. But we have to also make sure that the moralistic approach will not come at expense of more tangible means of defending the Philippines’ claims and national interest. - Rappler.com

Richard Javad Heydarian teaches political science at De La Salle University, and is the author of "Asia's New Battlefield: US, China, and the Struggle for Western Pacific" (Zed, London). He is a regular contributor to Asia Maritime Transparency Initiativeof Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington D.C.

China’s Political Warfare Against The Us And Asian Allies

By NESTOR MATA

October 27, 2015

WHOEVER wins the Philippine presidency next year should have enough knowledge and wisdom in navigating the country’s foreign relations in the Asian troubled region.

We won’t know yet who of the aspirants for the presidency will be in the final list of the Commission on Elections in December. Still, this early we can say that only four of them will be the contenders, namely, Vice President Jejomar Binay, opposition leader; Mar Roxas, anointed by soon-to-be ex-President Noynoy Aquino as his administration’s bet; Senator Grace Poe aka “Mary Grace Poe Sonora Llamanzares”, an independent candidate; and Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago.

So far, Binay has vowed he will lead a better government if elected next year, while Roxas is expected to continue Aquino’s vaunted “Tuwid na Daan” programs. Poe, a political neophyte, promised to champion good governance and transparency. And Santiago will bring to the presidency her long experience as a lawmaker, a government administrator, and an expert in fiery political rhetoric.

Aside from the task of cleaning up the mess outgoing President Noynoy Aquino’s messy administration in 2016, whoever may be the next president, there is the problem of navigating the nation’s foreign relations in the troubled Asian region. Does he or she have enough knowledge, strength, and wisdom to handle foreign-policy matters, or even just a minimal foreign-policy credibility? 

One or two have talked about the maritime and territorial dispute in the South China Sea, particularly the West Philippine Sea, with China, but is he or she fully aware that Beijing has very recently expanded its aggressive activities in the Asian and Pacific regions? It’s called China’s “political warfare” against the United States and its allies in Asia.

A group of experts recently surveyed China’s efforts against Washington and its allies, according to Prahanth Parameswaran of The Diplomat magazine on current Asian and Pacific affairs. They said these Chinese actions should be examined as part of the broader effort to influence the thoughts and actions of foreign governments, groups and individuals in a manner favorable to Beijing’s own objectives --- activities known as political warfare or influence operations. Here are excerpts from an insightful article on the views of those experts:

Chinese political warfare is deeply rooted in Chinese history, according to Mark Stokes, executive director of the Project 2049 Institute. Stokes pointed out that Beijing has been distorting objective reality and the lengths to which it has been willing to go to do so has been practically striking. 

The practice also enjoys high-level bureaucratic support within the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). Political warfare --- known euphemistically in China as “PLA military liaison work” --- is supported by an elaborate organizational structure that includes elements of the PLA’s General Political Department as well as the CCP’s Central Propaganda Department. 

Aaron Friedberg, a professor at Princeton University, noted that Beijing has been using political warfare as an important part of its ongoing strategic competition with Washington. He said the goal is to persuade the United States to accept China as an equal, and eventually dominant, global power.

Chinese political warfare in the United States, Friedberg said, has become broader and more complex such that it now seeks to influence three particular groups --- “old friends” of China, who were rewarded with dialogues and business ventures; influential elites in business, diplomats and the military who were courted through visits, exchanges and joint research projects; “mass perceptions” swayed through mass media. 

On Taiwan, according to Stokes, the Chinese objective was to ensure that all countries of the world would recognize the People’s Republic of China as the legitimate representative of all of China, including Taiwan by working to implement the “one country, two systems” formula.

With respect to Japan, Randy Schriver, the president and CEO of the Project 2049 Institute, said that China is using history as a major part of its political warfare in order to create a distorted narrative of Japanese “militarization” and to sow divisions within the US-Japan alliance. 

Beijing’s selective reading of history, in the view of Shriver, former Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, not only largely leave out the last 70 years during which the US-Japan alliance has been one of the foundations of Asian prosperity, including China’s, but hides China’s own abuse of history in its museums and textbooks. 

Incidentally, the conference participants didn’t include in their discussion other US allies in Asia, such as the Philippines and Vietnam, among the priority countries for Chinese political warfare. But they did acknowledge that Chinese political warfare activities face some serious limitations, including the growing tension between words and deeds as well as the broadening of the conversation on China in Washington which makes it more difficult to control narratives.

For the United States, concluded one of the experts, the focus should be on hardening the country against Chinese political warfare activities, and efforts could range from increasing transparency to constructing “counter-narratives” to undermine Chinese messages and expose either weaknesses in capabilities or transgressions of various kinds, including the maritime realm.

Otherwise, the US-China relationship would take past a point of no return! 

source:  Malaya

Angry China says shadowed U.S. warship near man-made islands in disputed sea

The US Navy guided-missile destroyer USS Lassen sails in the Pacific Ocean in a November 2009 photo provided by the U.S. Navy.

A U.S. Navy guided-missile destroyer sailed close to China's man-made islands in the disputed South China Sea on Tuesday, drawing an angry rebuke from Beijing, which said it warned and followed the American vessel.

The patrol by the USS Lassen was the most significant U.S. challenge yet to the 12-nautical-mile territorial limits China asserts around the islands in the Spratly archipelago and could ratchet up tension in one of the world's busiest shipping lanes.

One U.S. defense official said the USS Lassen sailed within 12 nautical miles of Subi Reef. A second defense official said the mission, which lasted a few hours, included Mischief Reef and would be the first in a series of freedom-of-navigation exercises aimed at testing China's territorial claims.

China's Foreign Ministry said the "relevant authorities" monitored, followed and warned the USS Lassen as it "illegally" entered waters near islands and reefs in the Spratlys without the Chinese government's permission.

"China will resolutely respond to any country's deliberate provocations," the ministry said in a statement that gave no details on precisely where the U.S. ship sailed.

Foreign Ministry spokesman Lu Kang later told a daily briefing that if the United States continued to "create tensions in the region," China might conclude it had to "increase and strengthen the building up of our relevant abilities".

Lu did not elaborate, except to say he hoped it did not come to that, but his comments suggested China could further boost its military presence in the South China Sea.

"China hopes to use peaceful means to resolve all the disputes, but if China has to make a response then the timing, method and tempo of the response will be made in accordance with China's wishes and needs."

The second U.S. defense official said additional patrols would follow in coming weeks and could be conducted around features that Vietnam and the Philippines have built up in the Spratlys.

"This is something that will be a regular occurrence, not a one-off event," said the official. "It's not something that's unique to China."

White House spokesman Josh Earnest referred questions on any specific operations to the Pentagon but said the United States had made clear to China the importance of free flow of commerce in the South China Sea.

The U.S. Navy last went within 12 miles of Chinese-claimed territory in the Spratlys in 2012.

China claims most of the South China Sea, through which more than $5 trillion of world trade passes every year. Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei, the Philippines and Taiwan have rival claims.

The Philippines, a vocal critic of China's activities in the South China Sea, welcomed the U.S. action.

"The American passage through these contentious waters is meant precisely to say that there are norms as to what freedom-of-navigation entails and they intend to exercise so there is no de facto changing of the reality on the ground," President Benigno Aquino told reporters.

RISK OF ESCALATION

The decision to go ahead with the patrol follows months of deliberation and it risk upsetting already strained ties with China.

"By using a guided-missile destroyer, rather than smaller vessels ... they are sending a strong message," said Ian Storey, a South China Sea expert at Singapore's Institute of South East Asian Studies.

"They have also said, significantly, that there will be more patrols – so it really now is up to China how it will respond."

Some experts have said China would likely resist attempts to make such U.S. actions routine. China's navy could for example try to block or attempt to surround U.S. vessels, they said, risking an escalation.

Zhu Feng, executive director of the China Centre for Collaborative Studies of the South China Sea at Nanjing University, said he expected Beijing to limit its response as it ultimately did not want confrontation.

"Both sides will be quite verbal but real actions, I hope, will show signs of exercising restraint," Zhu said.

COMPETING CLAIMS

Both Subi and Mischief Reefs were submerged at high tide before China began a dredging project to turn them into islands in 2014.

Under the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, 12-nautical mile limits cannot be set around man-made islands built on previously submerged reefs.

Washington worries that China has built up its outposts with the aim of extending its military reach in the South China Sea. China says they will have mainly civilian uses as well as undefined defense purposes.

The patrol comes just weeks ahead of a series of Asia-Pacific summits President Barack Obama and Chinese President Xi Jinping are expected to attend in the second half of November.

Xi surprised U.S. officials after a meeting with Obama in Washington last month by saying that China had "no intention to militarize" the islands.

Even before that, however, satellite photographs had shown the construction of three military-length airstrips by China in the Spratlys, including one each on Subi and Mischief reefs.

Some U.S. officials have said that the plan for patrols was aimed in part at testing Xi's statement on militarization.

Pentagon officials say the United States regularly conducts freedom-of-navigation operations around the world to challenge excessive maritime claims.

In early September, China sent naval vessels within 12 miles of the Aleutian Islands off Alaska. China said they were there as part of a routine drill following exercises with Russia.

(Reporting by Andrea Shalal, Yeganeh Torbati and David Brunnstrom in Washington and Ben Blanchard in Beijing; Additional reporting by Tim Kelly in Tokyo, Grego Torode in Hong Kong and Lincoln Feast in Sydney; Writing by Dean Yates and Alex Richardson; Editing by Robert Birsel)

source:  Reuters